Following Operation Sindoor, the ISI instructed Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad to collaborate on rebuilding and planning terror attacks jointly. However, the Hizbul Mujahideen, also affected by the operation, has been sidelined from most activities. The ISI’s deliberate strategy aims to exclude the homegrown Hizbul Mujahideen from operations due to a decline in local support for violence in Jammu and Kashmir.
Counterterrorism experts note a decrease in local terrorists as locals are less inclined towards violence. Despite the presence of overground workers, recruitment in Jammu and Kashmir has significantly slowed down. Security forces, empowered after the abrogation of Article 370, have neutralized many terrorists, targeting not only individuals but also their support networks.
The dismantling of the separatist network, crucial for the Hizbul Mujahideen, has made it challenging for the outfit to regain strength in the Valley. With the leadership eliminated swiftly by Indian security forces, new recruitments have plummeted, signaling a weakened appeal of the outfit. The ISI’s attempts to revive the Hizbul Mujahideen through online propaganda have largely failed to garner support in the Valley.
While the Jaish and Lashkar pose significant threats, the Hizbul Mujahideen was considered a more dangerous force due to its recruitment capabilities and ideological influence on the youth. However, the outfit’s command structure was swiftly dismantled, dissuading potential recruits from joining. The narrative of discrimination and violence by the Indian state, once used by the Hizbul Mujahideen, no longer resonates due to cleaner security operations and increased community support for the forces.
The Hizbul Mujahideen’s inability to adapt to the changing landscape and drum up support has rendered it ineffective, leading the ISI to limit its role within the terror network. The outfit’s lack of traction and relevance has pushed it to the sidelines, with the ISI likely to encourage cooperation with Lashkar and Jaish while preventing independent operations. The group’s diminished influence suggests a prolonged period of insignificance, as it struggles to find a foothold in the evolving dynamics of Jammu and Kashmir.
