Pakistan’s approach to militant groups, known as the distinction between “good militants” and “bad militants,” has resulted in some groups going beyond the state’s control, a report revealed. Since March 2000, over 72,000 individuals have lost their lives in terrorism-related violence in Pakistan, with casualties including civilians, militants, and security forces personnel, as per data from the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) cited in a report by ‘Assahifa.’
International policy institutes and analytical reports have associated the high toll with Pakistan’s strategy towards militant groups, which involved categorizing them as either aligned with the country’s interests or direct threats. The Brookings Institution’s analysis highlighted how Pakistan’s security establishment historically differentiated between these groups based on strategic considerations, a policy influenced by regional security dynamics over decades. While this approach granted Islamabad geopolitical advantages and supported its regional agenda at times, it inadvertently led to certain militant factions surpassing state control.
Researchers point out that Pakistan’s role as a key supporter of Afghan fighters during the Cold War laid the groundwork for the presence of militant infrastructure that persisted post-conflict. The security establishment’s strategic view categorized certain militant organizations as beneficial for national interests, while those targeting Pakistan itself were deemed security risks. This distinction, researchers argue, fueled the proliferation of militant entities and the rise of extremism, imposing significant security, social, and economic challenges on Pakistan.
Notably, relying on non-state armed groups for immediate strategic gains, as observed in Pakistan’s case, can pose enduring security threats, caution reports like the one from Brookings. The study underscores the complexities and risks associated with policies that prioritize short-term objectives over long-term stability.
